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THE LIFE AND PREMATURE DEATH OF
BABS: A PROPOSAL TO REINSTATE THE
SUBSIDIZED TAXABLE MUNICIPAL BOND
INTRODUCTION
Amidst severe contraction in the credit markets following the subprime
mortgage crisis, state and local governments had trouble raising capital
needed to fund public services, payrolls, infrastructure demands, and other
public projects.1 Further exasperating their condition, state and local
governments’ access to the municipal bond market—often used to fund
both long-term and short-term capital needs2—began to slip away as a
confluence of factors stemming from the mortgage-backed security crisis3
and lack of direct federal aid eroded investors’ confidence in the safety of
municipal bonds.4 Thus, despite the appeal of municipal bonds to certain
types of investors—an appeal largely created by federal tax exemptions for
interest earned on most municipal bonds5—the municipal bond market
failed to generate sufficient capital to meet state and local governments’
needs.6 Recognizing that, among other things, widespread state and
municipal defaults could have a potentially catastrophic impact on the U.S.
economy,7 the federal government enacted the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, which included the Build America Bonds
program.8
Build America Bonds (BABs) helped assuage municipalities’ mounting
capital needs by increasing their access to the credit markets.9 Subject to
federal income tax but federally subsidized in the amount of 35 percent of
the issuer’s interest costs, BABs10 broadened the municipal bond investor
pool by appealing to tax-indifferent investors11 while simultaneously
1. See Mary William Walsh, Cities Are Cutting Back Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at
A1; see also Philip Shishkin, States Cut Services for Elderly, Disabled —- As Budget Shortfalls
Force Reductions in Home Care, Low-Income People May Face Nursing Homes, Advocates Say,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2008, at D1.
2. Randle Pollard, Who’s Going to Pick Up the Trash?-Using the Build America Bond
Program to Help State and Local Governments’ Cash Deficits, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 171, 182–83
(2011).
3. See id. at 173, 191–92; see generally infra Part I.B.
4. See, e.g., Tara Bernard, Reassessing Safety of Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at B1;
see generally THIERRY PAULAIS, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: AN
ANALYSIS 5–6 (2009).
5. See 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2010).
6. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 172–73.
7. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-16, at 2 (2009) (Conf. Rep.).
8. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1531(a), 123
Stat. 115, 358 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54AA) [hereinafter ARRA of 2009].
9. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TREASURY ANALYSIS OF BUILD AMERICA BONDS ISSUANCE
AND SAVINGS 3 (2011) [hereinafter TREASURY ANALYSIS].
10. 26 U.S.C. § 54AA(b) (2009).
11. Lynn Hume, Bond Lawyers: BABs May Have Permanent Effect on Tax-Exempts, Expert
Says, THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 1, 2009, at 5.
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reducing borrowing costs for states12 and providing attractive returns for
investors.13 Widely considered a success,14 the BAB program helped state
and local governments raise capital, create jobs, and save money, while
benefitting a wider range of investors and strengthening the municipal bond
market as a whole.15
Since the BAB program’s expiration in December 2010, many
commentators have advocated making BABs a permanent fixture of the
federal tax code.16 One notable advocate is President Barak Obama, who
championed the program’s renewal in his budget proposals for fiscal years
2011, 2012, and 2013.17 President Obama’s BAB proposals would expand
the bonds’ eligible uses and would set the subsidy rate at 28 percent.18 Yet,
commentators on and off Capitol Hill have attacked the President’s
proposals, citing fears that BABs would be used to perpetuate unsustainable
state spending,19 will unduly burden federal taxpayers,20 or might
completely replace traditional tax-exempt bonds.21 Others support the idea
of taxable bonds, but would limit President Obama’s proposal by changing
the subsidy rate, placing caps on BAB issuance, limiting the types of
activities that may be funded by BABs, and/or using taxable bonds to
12. By reducing issuers’ debt servicing costs, the subsidy allows issuers to offer more
competitive interest rates to investors. See generally Part II.
13. Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: How Long Will the Tax Break on Municipal Bonds
Last?, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2011, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4052748704810504576307233579693982.html. See also infra Part II.B.
14. See, e.g., David Wessel, A Stimulus Plan Success Story, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2010, at A2;
see also Steven Gandel, A Stimulus Success: Build America Bonds Are Working, TIME (Nov. 17,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1939720,00.html.
15. See The Reviews Are In: States, Cities Hail Build America Bonds Program, U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY (June 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Documents/Build
%20America%20Bonds%20Reviews%20-%20FINAL,%2006-10-10.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY
NEWSLETTER]; see also TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 4.
16. See generally infra Part III.C.
17. For President Obama’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, see DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS
11–12 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter FY2013 EXPLANATIONS], available at http://www.treasury.gov
/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf. For President Obama’s
budget proposal for fiscal year 2012, see DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF
THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2012 REVENUE PROPOSALS 20–21 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter
FY2012 EXPLANATIONS], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy
/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2012.pdf.
18. See FY2013 EXPLANATIONS, supra note 17, at 11–12. See also infra Part III.C.
19. See Steven Malanga, Letter to the Editor, The ‘Build America’ Debt Bomb, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 22, 2010, at A19; Eric Stewart, Letter to the Editor, Can BABs Be a Real Growth-Producing
Sweetheart?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2010, at A18.
20. See Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley: Build America Bonds Program Keeps Getting Richer
for Wall Street, Harder on Taxpayers (Mar. 16, 2010), http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm
?customel_dataPageID_1502=25758 (noting in his floor speech that BABs are a costly program
that ultimately lines Wall Street pockets through underwriting fees).
21. See PETER G. KESSENICH, MUNICIPAL MARKET UPDATE 37–48 (2011), available at
http://aysps.gsu.edu/images/LTDebt1045PK.pptx (suggesting that tax-credit bonds should not
replace tax-exempt bonds).

2012]

The Life and Premature Death of BABs

675

completely replace tax-exempt municipal bonds.22 From this, one would be
amiss to conclude that change is not in the air surrounding the municipal
bond market. But while the path remains unclear, the goal seems crystal:
creating an efficient, equitable, and stable municipal bond market for the
benefit of state and local governments and their citizens.
To be efficient, federal tax expenditures should achieve their political or
fiscal objectives directly, without spending money or forgoing taxes in
ways that do not optimally further those goals.23 Toward that end,
subsidized taxable bonds go a long way. Subsidized taxable municipal
bonds achieve greater efficiency by providing a direct subsidy to the
municipal issuer, thereby eliminating the inefficient and inequitable
“windfall” that investors in the upper tax brackets receive through investing
in tax-exempt municipal bonds.24 Furthermore, by broadening the investor
base, taxable bonds reduce market volatility by relieving demand pressures
in the municipal bond market.25 Nevertheless, lawmakers must tread
carefully when limiting municipal bonds’ tax-exempt status, because such
limitations might upset constitutional principles of state sovereign
immunity.26 With these objectives in mind, it becomes clear that
supplementing the traditional tax-exempt municipal bond market with
subsidized taxable municipal bonds best provides the means for attaining
these goals.
This note proposes that creating a subsidized taxable municipal bond
program to supplement traditional tax-exempt bonds, much like President
Obama’s proposal for fiscal year 2013, best provides for an efficient,
equitable, and stable municipal bond market by broadening the investor
pool, mitigating the windfall to investors in high tax brackets, expanding
taxable municipal bonds’ uses, and respecting the integrity of state
sovereignty.
Part I provides a brief overview of the municipal bond market, focusing
on the traditional tax-exempt municipal bond and the problems it faced in
the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis. Part II examines BABs, as
enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, by
briefly describing how the program works—on paper and in practice—and
the underlying policy rationales that contributed greatly to its success. Part
III surveys private investment strategies, issuer conduct, and legislative
proposals in the wake of the BAB program’s expiration in 2010. Part IV
analyzes the various legislative proposals with an eye towards creating an
efficient, equitable, stable, and constitutionally sound municipal bond
market. Finally, I conclude that a program similar to President Obama’s
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part III.C.
See generally infra Part IV.A.
See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.
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proposal for fiscal year 2013 would best facilitate optimal municipal bond
market conditions, benefitting both federal fiscal policy and state and local
economies.
I.

THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET

So that the reader may better understand this note’s proposal, this
section provides a brief overview of the municipal bond market’s objectives
and structure, the basic types of securities offered by issuers, and the typical
purchasers of those securities in order to give context to analysis in this
note’s subsequent sections. Additionally, to put the municipal bond system
in today’s perspective, this section will briefly examine the subprime
mortgage crisis’s impact on the municipal bond market.
A. THE IMPORTANCE, STRUCTURE AND TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET
State and local governments27 provide essential services for their
citizens, such as schools, hospitals, highways, parks, utilities, police,
firefighters, judicial services, community development, and other projects
related to the public welfare.28 Municipal governments fund these
expenditures29 primarily through taxes,30 though they also rely on
government aid, insurance trust revenue, and other sources of revenue such
as tolls and license fees.31 Yet, because municipal governments must create
annual budgets in anticipation of isolated or erratic periods of tax revenue,
the mismatch between projected periodic revenue and ongoing—and at
times unexpected—expenses creates a systemic need for alternative sources
of capital.32 To fill these gaps in revenue and expenditure requirements,
municipal governments raise money in the capital markets by issuing
municipal bonds.33
A municipal bond is a type of interest-bearing debt instrument issued
by state or local governments to fund certain types of financial needs.34

27. State and local governments will be referred to collectively as “municipal governments”
throughout the remainder of this note.
28. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES SUMMARY: 2008,
at 3–4, 10–11 (2011) [hereinafter CENSUS FINANCE SUMMARY 2008], available at http://www
.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/g08-alfin.pdf.
29. Such expenditures can be substantial in amount. According to the 2008 census, municipal
governments spent $826.1 billion on education alone. Id. at 1.
30. In 2008, taxes amounted to about one-half of municipal government revenue, with sales
and property taxes constituting about 65 percent of all tax revenue. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 3, 6.
32. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 171–72 (discussing state and local governments’ systemic
temporary cash flow deficits).
33. See id.
34. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 76 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
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Traditionally understood as constitutionally exempt from federal taxation,35
the Internal Revenue Code exempts interest on municipal bonds from
federal income tax36 as long as the bonds’ revenue and debt servicing are
sufficiently unrelated to nongovernmental private business.37 While there
are many types of municipal debt instruments, general obligation bonds and
revenue bonds comprise the two most common tax-exempt municipal
bonds.38 For general obligation bonds, the issuer’s full faith and credit
secures its debt servicing obligations, while specific pools or sources of
revenue secure the issuer’s debt servicing obligations for revenue bonds.39
The vast majority of outstanding municipal bonds are tax exempt.40
By exempting interest on municipal bonds from federal income tax,
Congress reduces municipalities’ costs of raising money for governmental
projects by increasing the bond’s after-tax yield.41 Thus, if the municipal
issuer sets the bond’s interest rate so that its yield is comparable to the
after-tax yield on a taxable bond of similar risk and qualities, the
municipality can offer lower interest rates than a comparable taxable bond
without reducing the bond’s value to the investor because the bond
purchaser will earn the same amount of interest on either bond.42 To
illustrate, an investor with a marginal tax rate of 30 percent would be as
willing to purchase a $1,000 taxable bond carrying a 7 percent interest rate
as he would a $1,000 tax-exempt bond carrying a 4.9 percent interest rate.43
Here, the investor would earn $49 in interest by purchasing either bond at
35. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (invalidating federal tax
on municipal bonds as repugnant to the Constitution because such a tax interferes with states’
sovereign power to raise money).
36. Subject to certain exceptions discussed infra note 37, “gross income does not include
interest on any State or local bond.” I.R.C. § 103(a) (2012); but see U.S. CONST. amend. XVI
(“The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.”). Yet, ultimately persuaded by U.S. Supreme Court cases like Pollock v. Farmer’s
Loan & Trust Co., Congress believed that interest on municipal bonds should be tax free and
enacted § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code. See Patrick Manchester, Note, Be Kind to Your
Foreign Investor Friends, 98 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1829 (2010).
37. Under I.R.C. § 103(b), the federal tax exemption provided in § 103(a) does not apply to:
(1) private activity bonds that are not qualified; (2) arbitrage bonds; or (3) bonds in unregistered
form. I.R.C. § 103(b). Unqualified private activity bonds, as defined in § 103(b), are municipal
bonds where more than 10 percent of the issuer’s proceeds are used for any nongovernmental
private business use and more than 10 percent of either payment or security for debt services are
derived from such private business or its property. Id. § 141(a)–(c).
38. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 178.
39. Because general obligation bonds are effectively secured by all revenue potentially
attainable though the municipal government’s taxing powers, while revenue bonds are secured
only by specific pools of resources, investors typically demand higher interest rates for revenue
bonds to account for those bonds’ increased risk of default. See id. at 178–79.
40. See id. at 180.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX-CREDIT BONDS AND THE FEDERAL COST OF FINANCING
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 4 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 CBO REPORT].
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par value because the investor’s $70 pre-tax earnings on the taxable bond
will be reduced by $21 (30 percent of $70) by federal income tax, resulting
in a $49 after-tax yield.44 In effect, Congress helps municipalities pay for
the extra amount of interest needed to attract investors interested in
comparable taxable bonds by forgoing income taxes it could have collected
from the municipal bond purchaser.45 By making municipal bonds less
expensive for issuers, Congress encourages public projects, which benefits
the general welfare in turn.46
Excluding interest earnings on municipal bonds from gross income
appeals to a specific category of investors—investors who would gain most
from not paying taxes. Thus, tax-exempt municipal bonds attract investors
with higher marginal tax rates as well as other investors that are interested
in reducing their taxable income, such as banks, investment fund managers,
and casualty insurance companies.47
B. THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET
In 2007, after the U.S. housing market enjoyed steadily increasing real
estate values during the beginning half of the decade, real estate values
dropped off severely.48 Because many homes purchased during the housing
boom were financed through subprime mortgages—mortgages targeting
consumers with little assets and poor credit scores—the drop in home
values caused real estate values to drop below mortgage values. This drop
in value gave hundreds of thousands of mortgagers an incentive to enter
into foreclosure and greatly reduced or eliminated the value of those
mortgages.49 As subprime mortgage brokers packaged prime and subprime
mortgages into single pools of mortgage-backed securities for resale—
making it difficult to separate subprime mortgages from prime mortgages—
entire investment pools were severely reduced in value, collapsing the
subprime mortgage industry and greatly harming investors that purchased

44. See id.
45. As we shall see, Congress pays more than the amount necessary to attract the marginal
taxpayer to purchase municipal bonds without providing any extra benefit to the municipal issuer,
resulting in an inefficient allocation of government resources. See infra Part II.B.
46. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 180.
47. See id. at 201.
48. AFP, Housing Woes Take Bigger Toll on Economy than Expected, Says US Treasury
Secretary, THE DAILY STAR (Tues., Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news
-details.php?nid=7828.
49. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 192.
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those securities.50 As a result, many large financial institutions either filed
for bankruptcy or suffered severe reductions in capital.51
The subprime mortgage crisis increased municipal governments’ cost of
raising capital in the municipal bond market for a number of reasons. First,
and probably most apparent, uncertainty in the strength of financial markets
caused investors to retreat from the market, thereby reducing the demand
for municipal bonds.52 For those investors that remained, municipal issuers
had to pay higher interest rates on their bonds to compensate investors for
the increased amount of perceived risk. Second, the collapse of major
financial institutions53 meant that fewer underwriters were available to
underwrite municipal bonds, making underwriting fees more costly for
municipal governments.54 Third, municipal bond insurers, who also insured
many subprime mortgages, suffered major losses when mortgage defaults
increased dramatically after the housing bubble burst.55 As a result,
insurance rating agencies downgraded most municipal bond insurers,
raising the cost of insurance, and thus, increasing the cost of raising capital
through municipal bond offerings.56 Finally, municipal governments
themselves were experiencing financial hardship from reduced property and
income tax revenues.57 Consequently, as municipal governments entered a
period where their own finances were stretched thin, municipalities’ access
to the municipal bond market became increasingly difficult.
II. BUILD AMERICA BONDS
Congress created the BAB program to help financially strapped
municipal governments raise capital in the years following the subprime
mortgage crisis. To better understand the BAB program, this section
examines how BABs work within the federal tax code, Congress’ reasons
for enacting the program, and the program’s reception in and impact on the
municipal bond market.

50. Mara De Hovanesian & Matthew Goldstein, The Mortgage Mess Spreads, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 7, 2007, 5:11 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content
/mar2007/pi20070307_505304.htm.
51. See, e.g., Dan Wilchins, Merrill Sells Off Assets from Bear Hedge Funds, REUTERS (June
21, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/21/us-bearstearns-merrilllynch-idUSN2024
502520070621; Daniel Pimlott, H&R Block Feels Effects of Subprime Woes,
FINANCIALTIMES.COM (June 21, 2007, 7:36 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2485fd88-1ffa11dc-9eb1-000b5df10621.html#axzz1oxVLVrup.
52. Ryan Barnes, The Fuel That Fed the Subprime Meltdown, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (Sept. 4,
2007), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/subprime-overview.asp#axzz1bjRXywoG.
53. In 2008, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy,
and J.P. Morgan Chase acquired a failing Washington Mutual. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 192.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 193.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 192.
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A. BUILD AMERICA BONDS’ OPERATION IN THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
Section 1531 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
200958 amends Part IV of Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter A in the
Internal Revenue Code by adding § 54AA.59 Section 54AA authorizes state
and local governments to issue two general types of BABs,60 both subject to
federal income tax on interest earned by the investor.61 A state or local
government BAB issuer may choose to issue either “tax-credit” BABs62 or
“direct payment” BABs,63 depending on its financing needs.64
Section 54AA(b) provides that the tax credit due the holder of a “taxcredit” BAB described above is equal to “35 percent of the amount of
interest payable by the issuer with respect to such date,”65 net of the tax
credit.66 Thus, in effect, the BAB issuer receives a federal tax subsidy of
approximately 25 percent of the “tax-credit” BAB holder’s total return on
the bond.67 Here, the issuer’s borrowing costs are not reduced by the full 35
percent because the tax credit itself is taxed, causing the issuer to increase
the pre-tax coupon to offset the investor’s reduced tax credit.
In contrast, at the issuer’s irrevocable option,68 the municipal issuer
may elect to issue “direct payment” BABs, which provide a subsidy directly
to the BAB issuer equal to 35 percent of the total coupon interest payable to
the BAB investor.69 However, in contrast to the 35 percent subsidy
provided by a “tax-credit” BAB, the 35 percent credit in a “direct payment”
BAB is not taxed, which results in a deeper subsidy to the municipal issuer
than the “tax-credit” BAB effectively provides.70
The tax code restricts a municipal issuer’s uses of BABs. Section
54AA(d) provides that a BAB obligation may not be a “private activity
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

ARRA of 2009 § 1531, 123 Stat. 358 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54AA).
Id.
See I.R.C. § 54AA(a), (g) (2009).
See id. § 54AA(f)(1).
See, e.g., Notice 2009-26, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2009-16 I.R.B. 801, 834 (Apr. 20,
2009) [hereinafter IRB REPORT]; Pollard, supra note 2, at 199–200. See also CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUBSIDIZING INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT WITH TAXPREFERRED BONDS viii, 13 (Sherry Snyder ed., Oct. 2009) [hereinafter 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY]
(describing “tax-credit” bonds generally).
63. See, e.g., IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. 801, 834–35; Pollard, supra note 2, at 199–200. See
also 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 16 (describing “direct pay” bonds generally).
64. See generally IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B.at 833.
65. I.R.C. § 54AA(b).
66. See IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. at 834.
67. Id. In other words, the issuer receives a subsidy equal to 25 percent of what an issuer’s
interest obligations would have been had that issuer offered an unsubsidized taxable bond of
similar risk and qualities.
68. See I.R.C. § 54AA(g)(2)(B), 54AA(d)(1)(C).
69. See id. § 54AA(g)(1), (g)(2)(B), (d)(1)(C); see also id. § 6431(a), (b).
70. See IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. at 834 (noting that the “direct payment” BABs provide a
“deeper” subsidy than the “tax-credit” BABs).
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bond”71 and must be an obligation that “would (but for this section) be
excludable from gross income under section 103 [of the I.R.C.]”72 (i.e., a
“tax-exempt governmental bond”).73 In essence, BABs may not be used to
finance certain projects where more than 10 percent of the proceeds are
used for nongovernmental matters and where more than 10 percent of the
interest payments are secured by private assets.74 Additionally, BABs
cannot directly or indirectly finance loans to one or more nongovernmental
persons exceeding $5 million or 5 percent of the issue proceeds.75 In
general, “tax-credit” BABs are relatively restriction free and may be used to
finance any project that a municipal issuer could finance through a
traditional tax-exempt bond, including current refundings and advance
refundings of capital and working capital expenditures.76
In contrast to “tax-credit” BABs, “direct payment” BABs must be
“qualified bonds” as defined in § 54AA(g) in order to receive the 35 percent
subsidy, and hence, are more restricted in their uses. In principal part,
§ 54AA(g)(2) requires that 100 percent of the available project proceeds,77
divided by the amount held in a reasonably required reserve fund,78 be used
for capital expenditures only.79 As such, “direct payment” BABs cannot be
used for working capital expenditures or to refinance capital expenditures,
limiting the municipal issuer’s use of the “direct payment” BAB program.80
Finally, the BAB program spanned from April 2009 through December
2010, when it was allowed to expire.81 During the course of its existence, no
“tax-credit” BABs were issued, presumably due to the deeper subsidy
offered through the “direct payment” BAB program.82
71. I.R.C. § 54AA(d).
72. Id. § 54AA(d)(1). Section 54AA(d)(1) contains two more restrictions: (1) that the
obligation is issued before January 1, 2011; and (2) that the issuer makes an irrevocable election to
have § 54AA apply. See id. § 54AA(d)(1)(B), (d)(1)(C).
73. See IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. at 834.
74. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 11.
75. See id. at 12.
76. See id. at 11.
77. Available project proceeds means “the excess of— (i) the proceeds from the sale of an
issue, over (ii) the issuance costs financed by the issuer (to the extent that such costs do not exceed
2 percent of such proceeds),” including any proceeds from investing that excess, if any. I.R.C.
§ 54A(e)(4).
78. “Reasonably required reserve fund” refers to I.R.C. § 148(d) (arbitrage funds) and I.R.C.
§ 150(a)(3) (net proceeds). See IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. at 833, 835. Thus, if the reasonably
required reserve fund exceeds 10 percent of the total sale proceeds from the issue, the bond is an
“arbitrage bond” and does not qualify as a tax-exempt bond under § 103(b)(2), meaning that the
bond would also not be a BAB under § 54AA. See I.R.C. § 54AA(d)(1)(A).
79. I.R.C. § 54AA(g)(2) (2009); see also IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. 801, 835. The
“qualified activity bond” must also be a BAB, I.R.C. § 54AA(g), and the issuer must irrevocably
elect to have § 54AA(g) apply, I.R.C. § 54AA(g)(2)(B).
80. See FY2013 EXPLANATIONS, supra note 17, at 11–12.
81. See 2011 TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3.
82. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200; see also Patrick Temple-West, Senator Wyden Touts
Tax-Credit Bonds, Hits Tax Exemption for New Munis, THE BOND BUYER, Apr. 13, 2011,
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B. BAB FUNCTION AND POLICY
Congress’ objectives in creating the BAB program reflect the
underlying purposes of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009—promoting economic recovery by creating jobs and increasing
government spending.83 To wit, the BAB program assists municipal
governments finance capital projects by lowering the cost of borrowing,
thereby helping to create jobs and stimulate the economy.84 By focusing on
its underlying economic rationales, however, the BAB program reveals a
more optimal approach to federal tax incentives and highlights the reasons
for its success. In particular, the BAB program more efficiently allocates
the federal tax subsidy than traditional tax-exempt bonds and increases
investor demand for municipal bonds by widening the investor pool.85
1. Efficient Allocation of Federal Resources
“Direct payment” and “tax-credit” bonds more efficiently allocate
federal tax incentives by greatly reducing the tax expenditure inefficiencies
inherent in traditional tax-exempt bonds.86 Thus, to better understand how
the “direct payment” and “tax-credit” BAB programs are more efficient, it
is necessary to understand why traditional tax-exempt municipal bonds
inefficiently allocate federal resources.
By exempting the investor’s interest earnings from federal taxes,87 taxexempt bonds reduce a municipal issuer’s cost of borrowing by allowing
the issuer to sell the bond at a lower coupon rate than a similarly risky
taxable bond of comparable maturity.88 To illustrate, an investor P with a
marginal tax rate of 25 percent would be as willing to purchase a $1,000
taxable corporate bond with a 6 percent interest rate as she would a $1,000
tax-exempt municipal bond of comparable risk and maturity with a 4.5
percent interest rate because the investor’s net after tax interest earnings on
either bond would be same. The $60 coupon on the taxable corporate bond
will be reduced by $15 (25 percent of $60), resulting in net after-tax interest
earnings of $45, while the investor would similarly net $45 on the tax-free
municipal bond because its $45 coupon is not reduced by federal income
taxes. Thus, the federal tax expenditure89 of $11.25 (25 percent of $45)
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_71/wyden_tax_credit-1025513-1.html (reporting that no
issuer sold “tax-credit” BABs during the program’s lifespan).
83. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 199.
84. See id.; see also IRS Issues Guidance on New Build America Bonds, I.R.S. News Release
IR-2009-33 (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=206037,00
.html.
85. See 2011 TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3–4.
86. See generally 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62.
87. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2009).
88. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 9.
89. “Tax expenditure” refers to money forgone by the federal government through exemptions,
exclusions, or deductions. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON
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allows a municipal issuer to sell bonds with lower interest rates, thereby
reducing the municipality’s costs of raising capital.
Yet, because the municipal issuer must set the bond’s coupon rate at the
marginal tax rate of the “market-clearing” buyer,90 the federal tax
expenditure exceeds the amount by which the municipal issuer’s borrowing
costs are reduced. This results in a windfall to the investors in higher tax
brackets because the market-clearing buyer will probably be in a lower tax
bracket than most other investors in that municipal bond.91 To illustrate,
assume the same market conditions in the previous illustration and further
assume that the market-clearing buyer has a 25 percent marginal tax rate,
just as investor P above, which would cause the municipal issuer to set the
interest rate at 4.5 percent for a $1,000 bond. An investor R with a marginal
tax rate of 33 percent who invests in that $1,000 bond will realize a net
interest earning of $45 (4.5 percent of $1,000, the same interest earned by
the market-clearing investor above) but will save $14.85 in income taxes
(33 percent of $45). Thus, the federal government provides an additional
$3.60 “windfall” in forgone taxes ($14.85 for investor R minus $11.25 for
investor P) to investor R in the higher tax bracket without a corresponding
reduction in the issuer’s borrowing costs.92 In effect, the federal government
pays $1.32 in forgone taxes for each $1.00 given to the municipal issuer
when investor R purchases a tax-free municipal bond. This inefficient
allocation of tax expenditures is projected to cost the federal government
$132 billion—or more than $26 billion annually—between 2008 and 2012
for using tax-exempt municipal bonds to finance infrastructure projects
alone.93
“Direct payment” and, to a lesser degree, “tax-credit” taxable bonds,
such as those authorized by the BAB program, eliminate the inefficient and
seemingly inequitable94 result of the tax-exempt municipal bond system.
For “direct payment” BABs, each federal dollar spent to reduce the issuer’s
borrowing costs goes directly to the issuer, regardless of the marketclearing investor’s marginal tax rate, without accumulating
disproportionately in the higher tax brackets. This results in greater savings
for issuers without compromising the competitiveness of the bond’s

TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES 2
(Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS].
90. The marginal tax rate of the “market-clearing” investor is determined by asking at what
interest rate the supply of tax-exempt bonds would equal demand. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY,
supra note 62, at 31–32.
91. See id. at 34; 2004 CBO REPORT, supra note 43, at 4.
92. In effect, investor R in the higher tax bracket is receiving the value of a taxable corporate
bond of similar risk and maturity carrying a coupon of $67.16 (6.716 percent interest rate).
93. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 31.
94. See STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX CREDIT BONDS: OVERVIEW AND
ANALYSIS 10 (April 16, 2009); Manchester, supra note 36, at 1825–27; see also infra Part IV.B.
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coupon.95 For example, a $1,000 taxable “direct payment” BAB with a 6percent interest rate (the same coupon as the comparable corporate bond
described above) would produce $60 in pre-tax interest income for both
investors R and P above (6 percent of $1,000). After taxes, investors R and
P would net $40.20 ($60 reduced by 33 percent) and $45.00 ($60 reduced
by 25 percent), respectively, which is exactly what each investor would
earn if they had invested in taxable corporate bonds of comparable risk and
maturity. The “direct payment” BAB program, however, directly provides
the issuer $21 (35 percent of $60) for each of its payments to investors R
and P, reducing the issuer’s interest payments to $39 in both cases.96 Thus,
each federal dollar spent in the “direct payment” BAB program goes
directly to the issuer to reduce its borrowing costs rather than accumulating
in part in the upper tax brackets, shaving billions of dollars from the federal
government’s estimated $26 billion in forgone tax revenue through the use
of tax-exempt bonds.97
2. Widening the Investor Pool
Because they are taxable, BABs broaden the investor base in the
municipal bond market by appealing to “tax-indifferent”98 investors (i.e.,
investors without tax liability). Understanding why BABs broaden the
investor pool by appealing to “tax-indifferent” investors requires an
examination of the typical investors in tax-exempt municipal bonds and the
reasons for their decision to invest.
Tax-exempt municipal bonds principally appeal to investors that would
like to reduce their taxable income, such as high-income individuals and
juridical persons, due to their ability to capture the windfall tax-exempt
bonds provide investors in high tax brackets.99 Thus, mutual funds,
financial institutions, casualty insurers, investment portfolio managers, and
other taxpayers in high tax brackets typically invest in these tax-free

95. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 31–38.
96. In this example, the 35 percent subsidy rate is generous to the issuer because the issuer
effectively pays a $39 coupon (interest on a $1,000 bond with a 3.9 percent interest rate) rather
than the $45 coupon it would pay under the tax-exempt regime (here, the 4.5 percent interest rate
is set to net out the market-clearing investor’s income tax obligations). Because the marketclearing buyer in this example has a marginal tax rate of 25 percent, the 35 percent subsidy
overcompensates the issuer in the sense that the issuer would not be able to sell its bonds at a 3.9
percent interest rate and remain competitive with comparable taxable bonds. This provides the
issuer with a windfall. A “revenue neutral” subsidy rate would be set at the market-clearing
buyer’s marginal tax rate—here, at 25 percent of the issuer’s borrowing costs—to approximate the
issuer’s interest costs under a tax-exempt system. Most legislative proposals advocating
reinstating direct payment BABs attempt to set the subsidy at a “revenue neutral” rate. See infra
Part IV.
97. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at ix.
98. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200; see also TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3.
99. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200; see also supra Part II.B.1.

2012]

The Life and Premature Death of BABs

685

municipal bonds,100 with individuals and mutual funds owning about 70
percent of outstanding tax-exempt bonds.101 It is estimated that this
traditional tax-exempt municipal bond market has a total size of about $2.8
trillion.102
In contrast, BABs appeal to a different type of investor: investors who
do not have income tax liability or otherwise cannot take advantage of
traditional municipal bonds’ tax-exempt interest.103 These “tax indifferent”
investors include pension funds, university endowments, life insurance
companies, 401(k) retirement accounts, and foreign investors.104 Thus,
taxable BABs give municipal issuers access to the much larger $30 trillion
conventional taxable bond market, which includes “tax-indifferent”
investors.105 This broadened investor base increases demand and relieves
supply pressures for municipal bonds.106 As a result, municipal issuers
benefit from reduced market volatility107 and access to a deeper source of
funds, ultimately reducing the issuer’s borrowing costs.
C. BAB ISSUANCE AND IMPACT
Market commentators have regarded the BAB program to be successful
in many respects.108 Aside from the theoretical justifications given for the
BAB program,109 a review of BAB issuance and the projected savings
generated by such issuances provide further evidence of the program’s
success. I will discuss each consideration in turn.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200.
TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3.
Id.
See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200.
Id. at 200; see also Manchester, supra note 36, at 1835–44 (describing federal taxation of
foreign entities).
105. TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3–4.
106. Relieving supply pressures through expanding the investor base also benefits supply
pressure on tax-exempt bonds, reducing the issuer’s borrowing costs on those bonds as well. See
id. at 4.
107. See Manchester, supra note 36, at 1827; see also infra Part IV.C.
108. See Wessel, supra note 14 (noting that BABs helped revive the municipal bond market and
kept local construction projects going, reducing municipal issuers borrowing costs and broadening
the investor base in turn); Michael Decker, Letter to the Editor, BABs Promote Jobs and
Investment, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2010, at A12 (noting that issuers’ interest savings generated by
the BAB program is instrumental in creating and preserving jobs and promoting capital
investment, both of which help ease municipal governments’ important responsibilities to provide
roads, bridges, and water systems that are critical to our national infrastructure); Daisy Maxey,
Build America Bonds Gain Advisers’ Favor – Pension Funds, 401(k)s Are Buying In, WALL ST. J.,
July 9, 2010, at C9 (noting that BABs are attractive to and are used by investment advisors for
clients in lower tax brackets and tax-free institutional investors such as endowments and
foundations); Dan Seymour, Volume Cranked It Up in 2009 – BABs Boost Year to 2nd-Highest
Ever, THE BOND BUYER, Jan. 4, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues
/119_250/new-issue-volume-december-2009-1005601-1.html (noting the BAB program’s large
and beneficial impact on municipal finance).
109. See supra Part II.B.
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First, municipalities issued a higher percentage of taxable bonds during
the life of the BAB program, which was largely attributable to “direct
payment” BAB issuances.110 In the ten years before the BAB program,
taxable bonds constituted about 7 percent of total municipal bond
issuance.111 After the BAB program took effect in April 2009, “direct
payment” BAB issuance rose to 24 percent of total municipal bond
issuance, dropped to 16 percent in the summer of 2010, then rose to about
33 percent in the last three months prior to the program’s expiration in
December 2010.112 Municipalities in all fifty states issued BABs during the
program’s lifetime, with the largest issuers being California ($37.68
billion), New York ($20.63 billion), and Illinois ($11.23 billion).113 In total,
$181 billion of BABs were issued during the program’s lifetime.114
Municipal governments’ extensive use of “direct payment” BABs reflects
the program’s economic utility and importance in the context of municipal
finance.115
Second, apart from saving the federal government more money,116
“direct payment” BABs provided municipal issuers with deeper savings on
interest obligations than traditional tax-exempt municipal bonds.117 By
looking at their respective yields through a “fixed effects” regression
model,118 the U.S. Treasury Department determined the present value of a
“direct payment” BAB issuer’s net savings as compared to the net savings
generated by comparable tax-exempt bonds.119 Specifically, to determine
the net savings a municipal issuer of “direct payment” BABs receives as
compared to an issuer of comparable tax-exempt bonds, one must: (1)
determine the BAB’s yield; then (2) compute the predicted interest rate of a
comparable tax-exempt bond (taking into account the “fixed effects”
regression model); and then (3) apply the 35 percent direct subsidy to the

110. See Seymour, supra note 108. See also Pollard, supra note 2, at 200 (noting that no “taxcredit” BABs had been issued during the pendency of the program).
111. See Dan Seymour, Munis See 3d Busiest November on Record, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 1,
2009, at 1, available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/118_229/new-issue-volume-november
-2009-1004416-1.html.
112. See TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 6.
113. See id. at 6–7.
114. See id. at 5.
115. See TREASURY NEWSLETTER, supra note 15.
116. For an explanation about how “direct payment” and “tax-credit” bonds provide more
efficient federal subsidies to the municipal issuer than do tax-exempt bonds, see supra Part II.B.1.
117. See TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 2.
118. The “fixed-effects” regression model used by the Department of the Treasury controls for
most issuer-specific and bond-specific characteristics on the date of issuance, including: (1) the
riskiness of the issuer as perceived by the market; (2) the quality of the bond’s underwriting; (3)
the market’s perception of economic factors influencing the outlook of the issuer; and (4) the
maturity of the bond and its impact on the bond’s yield. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TREASURY
ANALYSIS OF BUILD AMERICA BONDS AND ISSUER NET BORROWING COSTS 5 (April 2, 2010)
[hereinafter TREASURY BORROWING REPORT].
119. See id. at 5–7.
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BAB issuer’s borrowing costs.120 From here, calculate the present value of
the BAB issuer’s net savings by: (a) subtracting the predicted yield on the
comparable tax-exempt bond from the BAB issuer’s final borrowing
costs;121 then (b) adjust that amount to present value.122 By way of a
concrete example, if California issued $3 billion in “direct payment” BABs
in 2009 with thirty-year maturities paying 7.8 percent interest while the
market interest rate for California’s comparable tax-exempt municipal bond
was 5.65 percent during the same period, California will have saved 0.85
percent,123 or $25.5 million, by using “direct payment” BABs.124 Reduced
to present value, California would save approximately $13 million using
“direct payment” BABs, assuming a 5 percent rate.125 Using this analysis,
the U.S. Treasury Department determined that municipal issuers saved
approximately $20 billion, on a present value basis, by using “direct
payment” BABs than they would have spent on comparable tax-exempt
bonds.126
III. LIFE AFTER BABS: ISSUER CONDUCT, PRIVATE
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, AND LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS
At the time of this writing, the eleven months following the BAB
program’s expiration on December 31, 2010 has seen a highly volatile
municipal bond market.127 In the first and second quarters of 2011, the
municipal bond market saw steep outflows of cash128 and municipal bond
120. See TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 11 n.6.
121. The BAB issuer’s final borrowing cost is the difference between steps (1) and (3) above.
122. See id. In its analysis, the U.S. Treasury also took into account the impact of underwriting
fees. For a more complete discussion of how underwriting fees affect the above calculus, see id. at
9–11; TREASURY BORROWING REPORT, supra note 118, at 8–10.
123. In this example, California’s net borrowing costs for the BABs would be 4.8 percent,
which is calculated by reducing 7.8 percent by 35 percent. Thus, California would have saved 0.85
percent in its borrowing costs by issuing “direct payment” BABs rather than comparable taxexempt bonds carrying 5.65 percent interest, because 5.65 percent minus 4.8 percent equals 0.85
percent.
124. Tom Petruno, U.S. Bond Plan Lowers Muni Yields; California’s Treasurer Boosts the Size
of a Debt Offering that Includes Subsidized Build America Bonds, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at
B2.
125. Here, the present value factor for a 30 year annuity at 5 percent interest is 15.3725. See
Time Value of Money Tables, STUDYFINANCE.COM, http://www.studyfinance.com/common
/TVMTable4.pdf.
126. See TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 11.
127. See Carla Fried, Gauging Those Tremors in Municipal Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at
BU13,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/mutfund/09muni.html
?pagewanted=all; Steven Permut, Understanding Recent Municipal Bond Market Volatility,
AMERICAN CENTURY INVESTMENTS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.advisorperspectives.com
/commentaries/aci_10411.php.
128. The outflows began in November 2010, see Gregory White, The Shocking Selloff in Muni
Bonds That Has Investors Running Scared, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 8, 2010,
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2010-12-08/wall_street/29965743_1_muni-bond-muni-market-
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issuances at record lows.129 Yet, the latter half of 2011 saw strong inflows
into the municipal bond market130 and low municipal default rates.131 This
volatility in the municipal bond market has been attributed to fluctuations in
the Treasury bond market,132 uncertainty about whether Congress will
extend the BAB program and/or the Bush tax cuts,133 and speculation about
whether municipal governments would be able to meet their interest
obligations to investors.134 Amidst this market climate, municipal issuers,
investors, and Congresspeople have reacted by engaging in questionable
disclosure conduct, employing potentially unstable investment strategies,
and proposing amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, respectively.
A. ISSUER CONDUCT
Municipal issuers’ disclosure of relevant financial information enables
investors to better analyze the issuer’s credit risks and potential for default.
As a result, investors place great value on timely and accurate disclosure of
bond-situation, remained steep through early 2011, see Dan Seymour, Mutual Fund Cash Exodus
Continues, THE BOND BUYER, Jan. 10, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues
/120_6/-1021922-1.html, and continued through spring 2011, see Jeannette Neumann, Misery
Continues for Munis – After Dismal Quarter for Issuance, Signs Point to Weak Investor Demand,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2011, at C1. In total, investors withdrew an estimated $45 billion from the
municipal bond market during the record twenty-six consecutive weeks of withdrawals ending in
early May 2011. See Ben Levisohn, Five Reasons to Rethink the Muni Rally – Municipal Bonds
Have Surged – but Investors Need to be Skeptical; Here’s Why, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2011, at
B7.
129. See Neumann, supra note 128 (reporting that first week of April concluded the slowest
quarter for municipal bond issuance in eleven years); see also Kelly Nolan, A Deep Freeze Hits
Muni Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2011 at C1.
130. See Muni Bond Fund Inflows Best since August 2010—ICI, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2011, 3:15
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/investing-fundflows-ici-idUSN1E7AF1IZ201
11116; Michelle Kaske, Investment in Local Governments Hits One-Year High: Muni Credit,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2011, 12:23 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news
/2011-10-04/investment-in-local-governments-hits-one-year-high-muni-credit.html. Nevertheless,
it is worth observing that September and October 2011 inflows were still far short of total
municipal bond inflows during the pendency of the BAB program in October 2010.
131. See Michael McDonald, Meredith Whitney Loses Credibility as Muni Defaults Fall 60%,
BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-15/muni-default-plunge
-belies-whitney-prediction-as-borrowers-shun-insolvency.html.
132. The U.S. Treasury market volatility continued following Standard & Poor’s downgrade of
the Treasury in August 2011. See Jonnelle Marte, The Ripple Effects of the Downgrade,
SMARTMONEY.COM (Aug. 8, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://www.smartmoney.com/invest/bonds/what
-does-the-downgrade-mean-for-bonds-1312664759999/.
133. See Permut, supra note 127.
134. See Shah Gilani, The Looming Muni-Bond Meltdown: Profit from the Collapse—and Then
Again from the Rebound, MONEY MORNING (Mar. 3, 2011), http://moneymorning.com
/2011/03/03/the-looming-muni-bond-meltdown-profit-from-the-collapse-and-then-again-from-the
-rebound/ (commenting on Nouriel Roubini’s prediction of municipal defaults in 2011); Dave
Lindorff, Despite Dire Prediction, Muni Default Pace Slows in First Half, ONWALLSTREET.COM
(July 8, 2011), http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/meredith-whitney-muni-bonds-defaults
-2674137-1.html (commenting on Meredith Whitney’s prediction of municipal defaults in 2011).
Both Whitney’s and Roubini’s predictions have subsequently been discredited. See McDonald,
supra note 131.
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municipal issuers’ financial reports.135 Yet, municipal bond issuers’
disclosure practices have historically been inconsistent, intermittent, and
incomplete,136 with some commentators observing that disclosure has
become even worse since the sufferings following the subprime mortgage
crisis.137 Not surprisingly, investors have become increasingly more uneasy
about the municipal bond market following the crisis and the BAB
program’s expiration.138 Poor disclosure practices have prompted the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to investigate cases where
municipalities failed to warn their investors about fiscal problems, leading
to SEC investigations of the State of New Jersey, the State of Illinois, and
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.139 These poor disclosure practices decrease
investor confidence in municipal bonds at a time when municipal
governments still face difficulties in raising capital.140
B. PRIVATE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
In the volatile municipal bond market following the expiration of the
BAB program, municipal bond investors have resorted to potentially risky
investment strategies, including credit default swaps (CDSs) tied to
municipal securities and private loans from the investor to the distressed
issuer.141 With respect to CDSs, large derivatives dealers142 have developed

135. See FINRA, Municipal Bonds—Staying on the Safe Side of the Street in Rough Times,
FINRA.COM, http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/bonds/p118923 (last
visited Apr. 25, 2012); DCP DATA Issues New Study on Transparency in the Municipal Bond
Market, DCP DATA (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.dpcdata.com/html/newsid45.html [hereinafter
DCP DATA].
136. For a look at state and local financial disclosures within the municipal bond market, see
Tesia Nichole Stanley, Note, Narrowing the Disclosure Gap: Is EMMA EDGAR for the Municipal
Securities Market?, 7 J.L. ECON & POL’Y 91 (Fall 2010) (noting that, for fear of running afoul of
the 10th Amendment, the federal regulatory framework for municipal securities is weak and
results in inconsistent and hard-to-find issuer disclosure documents).
137. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Bondholders Left in the Dark – Concern Grows Over Lack of
Financial Disclosure by State, Local Governments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2011, at C1 (noting that
40 percent of municipalities completely failed to file disclosure statements concerning their
municipal bonds in three or more years between 2005 and 2009); DCP DATA, supra note 135
(finding that issuers’ promised time for disclosure of financial documents grew to 228 days in
2010).
138. See Dugan, supra note 137.
139. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges State of New Jersey for Fraudulent Municipal Bond
Offerings, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm., Aug. 8, 2010 (SEC investigation of State of New
Jersey); Dugan, supra note 137 (noting SEC investigation of Illinois State); Charles Thompson,
SEC Subpoenas Harrisburg Officials, Investigates Municipal Bond Issues, PENNLIVE.COM
(updated Feb. 2, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/02
/post_175.html (discussing SEC probe into Harrisburg, Pennsylvania disclosure practices).
140. See Dugan, supra note 137.
141. See Katy Burne, Some Banks See Profit in Muni Woes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2010, at C1
[hereinafter Burne1] (discussing “muni CDSs”); Jason Zweig, Unwitting Angels: When Fund
Investors Become Bankers, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2011, at B1 (discussing privately negotiated
loans between investors and municipal issuers). See also Jean Eaglesham, Mutual Funds’ Muni-
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CDSs tied to municipal bonds in hopes to attract more buyers into a
municipal bond market plagued by massive investor selloffs.143 Essentially,
these CDSs obligate swap sellers (i.e., “protection sellers”) to compensate
the swap buyers (i.e., “protection buyers”) when a municipal issuer defaults
on its interest obligations to bondholders, effectively allowing swap buyers
to speculate on and profit from municipal defaults.144 Market commentators
have observed that CDSs tied to municipal bond defaults encourage
speculators to bet on financially weakened municipal issuers, thereby
contributing to the issuer’s financial distress and, in turn, undermining the
stability of municipal bonds.145 Additionally, some mutual funds—which
otherwise cannot “short” municipal bonds146—that invest in municipal
bonds have used other types of derivatives to achieve the functional
equivalent of a CDS tied to municipal bonds.147 In a market that has been
criticized as being under regulated,148 the use of CDSs and other derivatives
to bet against municipal issuers negatively affects the municipal bond
market without providing much benefit.149
Another potentially risky private investment strategy involves privately
negotiated loans from mutual fund investors to financially distressed

Debt Prices Are Questioned, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2011, at C1 (mutual funds overstating value of
thinly-traded municipal bonds).
142. Such dealers include UBS AG, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup Inc., Goldman
Sachs Group Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and Morgan Stanley. See Burne1, supra note 141.
143. See id.
144. See Richard R. Zabel, Credit Default Swaps: From Protection to Speculation, ROBINS,
KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI L.L.P. (Sept. 2008), http://www.rkmc.com/Credit-Default-Swaps
-From-Protection-To-Speculation.htm; Burne1, supra note 141; John E. Peterson, Could Credit
Default Swaps Undermine the Fiscal Stability of Municipal Bonds?, GOVERNING.COM (Sept.
2010), http://www.governing.com/columns/public-finance/could-credit-default-swaps-undermine
-fiscal-stability-municipal-bonds.html.
145. See Burne1, supra note 141; Peterson, supra note 144.
146. See Katy Burne, Muni Bonds, with a Derivatives Twist, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2011, at C9
[hereinafter Burne2]. “Shorting,” or “short selling,” is an investment strategy where the short
seller borrows securities from a securities holder and sells those securities at market price, with
the intention of repurchasing those securities and returning them to the lender at a later date. The
short seller profits from these transactions when the short seller repurchases the sold securities
after the securities’ market value decreases. The short seller then pockets the difference between
the sale and repurchase prices upon returning the securities to the lender. Pursuant to the
Investment Company Act of 1940, the SEC regulates the extent to which mutual funds may
engage in short selling. See generally Note, Regulating Risk-Taking by Mutual Funds, 82 YALE
L.J. 1305 (1973).
147. See Burne2, supra note 146 (reporting that J.P. Morgan Asset Management started a
mutual fund in May 2011 using derivatives to achieve an economically similar effect of betting
against municipal bonds).
148. See Andrew Ackerman, Reg Reform, SEC Top Agenda, THE BOND BUYER (Dec. 30,
2009), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/118_248/regulatory-reform-1005502-1.html.
149. See Michael B. Marois, California’s Lockyer Seeks Leverage Limits to Curb ‘Naked’ Muni
Swap Trade, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2010, 4:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-04
/california-s-lockyer-seeks-leverage-limits-to-curb-naked-muni-swap-trade.html; Burne1, supra
note 141.
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municipal issuers.150 While these loans could help forestall losses from
municipal defaults, they essentially throw “good money . . . after bad” and
may lead to potentially treacherous consequences if the practice is left
unchecked.151 These loans are currently far from prevalent, but, according
to some experts, could become more common as municipal bond issuers
become more financially distressed.152
C. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
In the years following the BAB program’s expiration, at least six
legislative proposals to create some form of taxable bond—either in
addition to or in lieu of traditional tax-exempt municipal bonds—have been
introduced.153 While politicians have proposed eliminating tax-exempt
bonds or replacing tax-exempt bonds with some form of taxable bond since
1918,154 many of the current legislative proposals have not faded away as
their predecessors have done in the past.155 In part, this resilience may be
owing to the BAB program’s recent example of a well-functioning taxable
municipal bond.156 Even though each proposal is unique, it is possible to
group them into three general types.
The first and second types of proposals would eliminate tax-exempt
bonds and replace them with either “direct payment” bonds (where the
federal subsidy goes to the issuer) or with “tax-credit” bonds (where the
federal subsidy goes to the investor). Representative John Tierney’s Tax
Equity and Middle Class Fairness Act exemplifies the first type of proposal
and would replace tax-exempt bonds with “direct payment” taxable bonds
with the subsidy set at 28 percent of the issuer’s interest payments on the
bond.157 The Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2011,

150.
151.
152.
153.

See Zweig, supra note 141.
Id.
See id.
See H.R. 992, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep. Levin); H.R. 736, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep.
Richardson); H.R. 747, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep. Schiff); H.R. 11, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep.
Connolly); H.R. 2495, 112th Cong. § 523 (2011) (Rep. Tierney); S. 727, 112th Cong. § 111
(2011) (Sens. Wyden & Coats); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 235 (2012) (President
Obama’s proposal).
154. See Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: How Long Will the Tax Break on Municipal
Bonds Last?, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2011, at B1; see also Kevin M. Yamamoto, A Proposal for the
Elimination of the Exclusion for State Bond Interest, 50 FLA. L. REV. 145, 166–68 n.110 (1998)
(identifying 122 proposals between 1920 and 1943).
155. See Zweig, supra note 154.
156. See Daisy Maxey, Extension of BABs Would Lift Demand – Funds Likely to Add to Scant
Offerings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2010, at C9; Martin Vaughan, ‘Build America’ Permanently? –
Obama Will Seek to Continue the Temporary Municipal-Bond Program, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
2010, at B7.
157. H.R. 2495. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office issued a report in March 2011
recommending eliminating tax-exempt bonds and replacing them with taxable bonds carrying a 15
percent federal subsidy payable to the issuer. See Andrew Ackerman, New Build America Bonds
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sponsored by Senators Ron Wyden and Dan Coats (collectively, WydenCoats), typifies the second type of proposal and would give the investor a
tax credit in the amount of 25 percent of the issuer’s interest payments on
that bond.158
The third type of proposal, which is best typified by President Obama’s
proposed budget for fiscal year 2013, would supplement traditional taxexempt bonds with “direct payment” BABs, but would lower the federal
subsidy to a “revenue neutral” rate.159 In President Obama’s proposal, the
subsidy rate would be set at 28 percent of the issuer’s interest obligations160
and would expand BABs’ uses to include current refundings,161 short-term
governmental working capital financings for governmental operating
expenses, and financing for § 501(c)(3) nonprofit entities.162 Also, President
Obama’s American Jobs Act would have capped the tax exemption
available on tax-exempt bonds at 28 percent for individuals in upper income
brackets,163 which would limit tax savings on interest earned on tax-exempt
bonds in a way that no other proposal in this group has done.
IV. WEIGHING OUR OPTIONS—AN ANALYSIS OF THE
VARIOUS LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS UNDER THE LENS OF
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, VOLATILITY, AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Fundamental changes in the federal tax system ought to be assessed in
light of a diverse set of criteria to best achieve an effective and principled
decision. Thus, in analyzing the three types of legislative proposals outlined
above, I will consider each in light of economic efficiency, equitable

Proposal on Tap, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2011, 6:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748704662604576202722122800598.html.
158. S. 727, 112th Cong. § 111 (2009); see also Michael Corkery & Andrew Ackerman, MuniBond Tax Break Under Siege, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2011, at C2. The tax credit, however, is itself
subject to income tax. S. 727 § 111(a). See also infra Part IV.B.
159. See FY2013 EXPLANATIONS, supra note 17, at 11–12 (describing President Obama’s
proposal to extend the BAB program). Representatives Sandy Levin’s (Michigan), Gerry
Connolly’s (Virginia), and Adam Schiff’s (California) proposals would also supplement taxexempt municipal bonds with subsidized taxable bonds. See H.R. 992, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep.
Levin); H.R. 11, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep. Connolly); H.R. 747, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep.
Schiff).
160. Id. Representatives Levin’s and Connolly’s proposals would only reduce the subsidy to 31
percent in 2012. H.R. 992; H.R. 11. Representative Schiff would use a 28 percent subsidy rate.
H.R. 747.
161. Current refundings can be used to refinance prior public capital projects where the old
bonds are repaid within ninety days of issuing the current refunding bonds. See FY2013
EXPLANATIONS, supra note 17, at 21.
162. See id.
163. See Lynne Hume & Patrick Temple-West, Obama Proposal Stuns Market, THE BOND
BUYER (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_177/muni-reaction-obama-jobs
-bill-1031028-1.html.
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principles of federal tax law, influence on market volatility, and principles
of constitutional law.
A. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
In the context of federal tax expenditures, the concept of efficiency is
best stated by Professor Edward Zelinsky’s “technical efficiency”
taxonomy, where efficiency is measured by the degree to which the federal
government’s use of tax expenditures achieves those expenditures’
underlying governmental objectives.164 In the municipal bond market,
federal tax exemptions and credits aim to reduce municipal governments’
costs of raising capital needed for beneficial public projects.165 Thus,
whether tax exemptions, credits, or direct subsidies are efficient depends on
the degree to which the money spent or taxes forgone by the federal
government results in a reduction of municipal governments’ borrowing
costs.
As discussed in Part II, the amount of taxes forgone through exempting
interest on municipal bonds from federal income tax does not reduce the
municipal issuer’s cost of borrowing by the same amount.166 Because a
municipal issuer will use the market-clearing taxpayer’s marginal tax rate to
set the interest rate on its municipal bonds, investors in higher tax brackets
will receive a larger tax break than the issuer receives a reduction in interest
costs.167 As a result, the taxes forgone by the federal government do not
equal the benefit received by the municipal issuer.168 Therefore, this
windfall received by taxpayers in the upper tax brackets, inherent in taxexempt municipal bonds, results in an inefficient allocation federal
resources.169
The first and second types of legislative proposals would eliminate this
inefficiency by abolishing tax-exempt treatment of interest generated on
municipal bonds. Under the first type of proposal, tax-exempt bonds would
be replaced by “direct payment” bonds, where the federal government pays
the municipal issuer a fixed percentage of that issuer’s interest
obligations.170 Under this system, the federal government directly achieves
its goal of reducing municipal governments’ borrowing costs by making
payments directly to municipal issuers in amounts proportionate to the
issuer’s interest obligations. Therefore, by replacing tax-exempt bonds with
164. See Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549, 556 (2008).
165. See Manchester, supra note 36, at 1825; 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 1, 31,
33. Another underlying reason for exempting interest on municipal bonds derives from
constitutional issues of federalism, discussed infra Part IV.D.
166. See supra Part II.B.1.
167. See id.
168. See id.; see also Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 176–77.
169. See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 176–77; Manchester, supra note 36, at 1829–33; 2009
CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 33–34.
170. See supra Part III.C.
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“direct payment” bonds, the first type of proposal would greatly enhance
federal tax efficiency under Professor Zelinsky’s rubric.171
Under the second type of proposal, tax-exempt bonds would be
replaced by “tax-credit” bonds, where the federal government provides the
investor with a tax credit against the investor’s federal tax liabilities at a
fixed percentage of the bond’s pre-tax coupon. While there are many types
of tax-credit bonds currently available,172 the types proposed in the
legislation discussed above set the tax-credit level at 25 percent of the
issuer’s interest costs173 and would include the credit amount in the
investor’s gross income.174 Because the tax credit itself is taxed, the
municipal issuer must provide a slightly higher interest rate than it would if
it were receiving a “direct payment” subsidy of the same rate as the tax
credit.175 As a result, because the investor’s net tax savings will be less than
the amount of the tax credit, the tax credit does not reduce the issuer’s
borrowing costs at the same rate as the subsidy,176 resulting in a slightly less
efficient federal tax expenditure system than the “direct payment” option,
but a more efficient system than tax-exempt bonds.
Under the third type of proposal, “direct payment” bonds would be an
alternative to, but would not replace, tax-exempt bonds.177 Consequently,
the inefficiencies of the tax-exempt system would remain, but would be
diminished to the extent that the “direct payment” bonds displaced taxexempt financing of public projects. Additionally, legislation similar to
President Obama’s American Jobs Act might reduce the inefficiencies
inherent in tax-exempt bonds by limiting the amount of income an investor
may claim as tax exempt.178
On balance, replacing tax-exempt bonds with “direct payment” or “taxcredit” bonds results in a more efficient federal tax expenditure, suggesting
that the first two types of legislative proposals are more optimal than the
171. See Manchester, supra note 36, at 1833–34. Nonetheless, some argue that even the “direct
payment” subsidy is not completely efficient because the federal government expends resources
on implementing the subsidy. See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 189.
172. See, e.g., MAGUIRE, supra note 94, at 1–2.
173. S. 727 112th Cong. § 111 (2011) (Wyden-Coats proposal).
174. See I.R.C. § 54A(f) (2012); see also MAGUIRE, supra note 36, at 4.
175. See generally MAGUIRE, supra note 36, at 4; see also IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. 801,
835. In setting the interest higher on “tax-credit” bonds, the issuer makes the after-tax interest
earnings competitive with unsubsidized taxable bonds of similar risk and maturity by
compensating the investor for the portion of the tax credit the investor does not realize due to the
income tax.
176. See MAGUIRE, supra note 36, at 4.
177. See supra Part III.C.
178. See supra Part III.C. Presumably, such a cap would function similarly to a tax-credit bond,
but would avoid the double taxation in the tax-credit system (where the investor is taxed on the
bond interest and the tax-credit amount). However, it is unclear whether these “limited taxexempt” bonds proposed in the American Jobs Act would be sellable without also increasing the
coupon payable to the investor to compensate for any decreased demand from investors in the
upper tax brackets.
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third type of proposal. However, it is possible that using a more limited
form of tax-exempt bond, such as that proposed in President Obama’s
American Jobs Act, could also result in a more efficient federal tax
expenditure system without eliminating the traditional tax-exempt bond.
B. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL EQUITY
Although theoretical notions of vertical and horizontal equity present a
danger of exaggerating equities or inequities if viewed in isolation from the
tax system as a whole,179 vertical and horizontal equity nonetheless remain
important criteria for evaluating discrete tax proposals, especially those that
contemplate sweeping change.180 Vertical equity exists “when persons in
unequal situations are differentiated in an appropriate manner.”181
Horizontal equity exists “when taxation on income is applied equally to
those with equal incomes.”182
1. Vertical Equity
In the clearest sense, vertical equity is violated when the tax system
treats two taxpayers in different tax brackets differently (e.g., when
individuals in higher tax brackets pay a disproportionately small amount of
tax, relative to their wealth, than do individuals in lower tax brackets).183
The tax-exempt municipal bond system most vividly demonstrates this
violation of vertical equity. Due to the windfall tax-exempt municipal bonds
provide investors in tax brackets higher than the market-clearing investor,
taxpayers in the highest tax brackets receive the greatest amount of tax
benefit.184 “Direct payment” municipal bonds, such as those proposed in the
first type of legislative proposals, reduce the vertical inequities inherent in
the tax-exempt system because investors in different tax brackets pay
income taxes according to their individual levels of income, comparable to
what they would pay on any other unsubsidized taxable corporate bond.
Thus, “direct payment” bonds remove the windfall to the upper tax brackets
that make tax-exempt bonds vertically inequitable.185
Nevertheless, while “tax-credit” municipal bonds do not pose the same
degree of vertical inequity posed by tax-exempt bonds, “tax-credit” bonds
may still violate principles of vertical equity. For example, a “tax-credit”
bond would violate vertical equity if and to the extent that: (1) the tax credit

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See Jenn, supra note 164, at 555–56, 558.
See id. at 554.
Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 179.
Id. at 178–79.
See Jenn, supra note 164, at 555.
See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 179–80. See also supra Part II.B.1.
See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 189.
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exceeds the taxpayer’s tax liability;186 or (2) the tax credit is itself exempt
from taxes and investors are permitted to deduct the tax credit’s value from
their taxable income.187 Yet, the first problem may be remedied by giving
the investor in the lower tax bracket the ability to refund the tax credit for
cash or other value because each investor would be able to take the same
amount of tax credit regardless of their tax brackets.188 Likewise, the second
problem would not be vertically inequitable if the tax credits were
themselves taxable because the amount of the deduction would be
proportional to each investor’s tax rate. For example, legislation similar to
the Wyden-Coats proposal does not suffer from the second problem
because the tax credits are themselves taxable under I.R.C. § 54A(f).189
Therefore, even if the “tax-credit” bonds found in the second type of
legislative proposals suffer from one or both of these two problems, such
problems may be fixed, and, if remedied, would result in a more vertically
equitable system of federal tax expenditures.190
Finally, even though tax-exempt municipal bonds clearly violate
principles of vertical equity, President Obama’s American Jobs Act would
at least mitigate such inequity by capping the amount of interest income
otherwise excludable from taxes.191 Capping the tax-exemption on
traditional bonds eliminates the “windfall” generated by an unregulated taxexempt municipal bond system and creates a more vertically equitable tax
expenditure because all investors would be subject to the same cap
regardless of their respective tax brackets. Thus, all three types of
legislative proposals would increase vertical equity above the current taxexempt system, though the second and third types must satisfy certain
contingencies to ensure the same level of vertical equity available in a pure
“direct payment” system.192

186. An investor in a lower tax bracket might not be able to take advantage of the full value of
the tax credit if that investor’s tax liabilities are less than the tax credit. See Jenn, supra note 164,
at 557.
187. Here, the value to an investor in a higher tax bracket (investor R) of excluding a taxable
tax credit from income taxes is greater than the value an investor in a lower tax bracket (investor
P) would obtain from taking the same deduction because investor R is taxed at a higher rate,
allowing investor R to avoid a greater amount of tax liability than would investor P. See id. at 557.
188. See id.
189. S. 727, 112th Cong. § 111(a) (2009).
190. See id.
191. See Hume, supra note 163.
192. The second type of proposal would have to make tax credits refundable in the event that a
taxpayer’s tax liability was less than the amount of the tax credit, and would have to make the tax
credit taxable. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text. The third type of proposal must
reduce or eliminate the windfall to the upper tax bracket generated by tax-exempt bonds, much
like the American Jobs Act would. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.

2012]

The Life and Premature Death of BABs

697

2. Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity is violated when taxpayers with identical incomes
incur unequal tax liabilities, as would happen when one investor invests in a
tax-exempt bond and another investor with an identical income invests in a
taxable bond.193 Thus, the current municipal bond system violates
horizontal equity because two taxpayers in the same tax bracket would
incur different tax liabilities depending on whether they bought taxable or
tax-exempt bonds. In contrast, the first and second types of legislative
proposals—which would replace tax-exempt municipal bonds with “direct
payment” or “tax-credit” bonds, respectively—would eliminate horizontal
inequity because all investors who pay taxes would be taxed
proportionately to their income.194 Likewise, even though the third type of
legislative proposal would maintain both taxable and tax-exempt bonds,
President Obama’s cap on tax-exempt income on traditional tax-exempt
municipal bonds might reduce the horizontal inequity normally present in
the current municipal bond tax system because all investors with tax
liability would be subject to the same ceiling on the tax exemption. Thus,
on balance, the first two types of legislative proposals would go the furthest
in eliminating horizontal inequity, while the third type of proposal would
reduce horizontal inequity to the extent it included a cap on tax-exempt
interest on municipal bonds.
C. MARKET VOLATILITY
As we have observed in the years following the subprime mortgage
crisis, market volatility can have a negative impact on municipal issuers.195
Issuers’ uncertainty about future funding increases the amount of interest
demanded by investors to account for this risk, making it more expensive
for municipal governments to raise capital.196 Market volatility may be
reduced by increasing demand for municipal bonds, which may be achieved
by increasing the number of potential investors.197 Increased demand
lessens municipal issuers’ financial uncertainty, which reduces interest
demanded by investors, and hence, lowers the cost of borrowing for
municipal governments.198 As seen in Part II, “direct payment” BABs
increased and diversified the investor pool by appealing to “tax-indifferent”
investors,199 which gave municipal governments access to the much larger

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 179.
See id. at 189.
See supra Parts I.B. and III.
See Pollard, supra note 2, at 192–93.
See Manchester, supra note 36, at 1827.
See id.
See supra Part II.B.2.
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taxable bond market.200 Additionally, “tax-credit” municipal bonds—which
otherwise would not appeal to “tax-indifferent” investors—could also
widen the investor pool if such “tax-indifferent” investors could “strip” the
tax credit from the “tax-credit” municipal bond for resale to investors with
tax liability.201 As such, “direct payment” and “tax-credit” tax expenditure
systems benefit the municipal bond market by helping reduce market
volatility by increasing demand in a way that the traditional tax-exempt
market could not do on its own.
Yet, the first and second types of legislative proposals give with one
hand while taking away with the other: while both types expand the
investor base by making municipal bonds taxable, they also constrict the
investor base by eliminating the traditional tax-exempt market.202 In so
doing, these proposals could decrease demand, which would contribute to
increasing market volatility and, with it, municipal governments’ cost of
raising capital. Additionally, to the extent that the first two types of
proposals extend the BAB program without a corresponding expansion of
BABs’ uses, municipal issuers would be denied access to the municipal
bond market for a number of important capital needs,203 further restricting
their access to the capital markets. Therefore, while all three types of
proposals would reduce market volatility by giving municipal governments
access to the taxable bond market, this reduction would be limited to the
extent that the first proposal would displace “tax adverse” investors and to
the extent that both the first and the second proposals would restrict
the uses to which municipal governments could put the taxable bonds to
work.
D. CONSTITUTIONALITY
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust
Co. invalidated on constitutional grounds a federal tax imposed on interest
on state bonds.204 Commentators have reasoned that the Court used the
doctrine of “reciprocal intergovernmental tax immunity”205 to uphold the
federalist principle, beginning in McCulloch v. Maryland and later
expanded upon in Collector v. Day, that both state and federal governments
are each immune from taxes levied by the other due to their separate and

200. The taxable bond market is approximately $30 trillion, whereas the traditional tax-exempt
municipal market is approximately $2.8 trillion. See TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3–4.
201. See MAGUIRE, supra note 94, at 5.
202. See supra Part III.C. However, “tax adverse” investors would not be completely shunned
in a “tax-credit” system. In order to take advantage of the tax credits, an investor would have to
have tax liability.
203. For a description of restrictions placed on BABs within the Internal Revenue Code, see
supra Part II.A.
204. Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583, 586 (1895).
205. See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 163 n.86.
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inviolable sovereign powers.206 Although the Sixteenth Amendment later
permitted the federal government to tax “all income from whatever source
derived,”207 Congress nevertheless was hesitant to tax interest on state and
local bonds for fear of violating the federalist principles of the Constitution
and passed the first federal income tax exemption for interest on state
bonds.208
Commentators now suggest that the principal constitutional concern
implicated by a federal tax on municipal bond interest is not that the federal
government is without the power to do so, but rather that taxing municipal
bonds would undermine federalist principles inherent in the Constitution
and could lead to a gradual erosion of state sovereignty.209 Framed in this
way, a federal income tax on municipal bonds would be problematic
because the federal government would start down a path of controlling the
states’ power of the purse, a power that should not be exercised by the
federal government except for compelling reasons.210
Starting with the premise that a federal tax on municipal bonds should
be avoided if possible, the first and second legislative proposals—
eliminating tax-exempt bonds altogether—seem at odds with the federalist
teachings of Day and McCulloch. Indeed, commentators cite the fear that
the federal government gains too much control over state and local
spending through “tax-credit” or “direct payment” municipal bonds because
investors and issuers rely on the federal government to set a fair subsidy
rate and run the risk of retroactively losing their subsidies through tax
setoffs or noncompliance with arbitrage rules.211 The third type of
legislative proposal, however, would avoid treading on state sovereignty by
retaining tax-exempt municipal bonds and offering “direct payment”
municipal bonds to supplement the existing tax-exempt market. Finally, a
proposal similar to President Obama’s American Jobs Act would fall
206. See id. at 162–65. In Collector v. Day, the Court struck down a federal tax on a state
judge’s salary, reasoning that the states and the federal government may not be taxed by each
other. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 124 (1870).
207. “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and with regard to any census or
enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
208. See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 165–66.
209. See id. at 191.
210. See id. at 191–93 (“[A]lthough Congress may create laws that upset the balance of power
between the states and federal government, it should not create laws that impede federalism
principles unless it has no better choice.”).
211. See Nicole C. O’Neal, Build America Bonds: A Catalyst for the US Bond Market, 29
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 19, 20–21 (2010); Elana Schor, Behind Build America
Bonds’ Popularity, Some Lurking Concerns, THE WASH. INDEP. (Mar. 29, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://washingtonindependent.com/80724/behind-build-america-bonds-popularity-somelurkingconcerns (noting concern that the federal government might reduce subsidy levels in times
of fiscal stress); Michael McDonald, Build America with Obama Bonds Signals Munis’ Fall
(Update1), BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2009, 10:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=aQqI3SKPm.t4.
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somewhere between the first two proposals and the third type of proposal
because investors would not have to completely rely on the federal
government to provide fair federal subsidies (by retaining tax-exempt
bonds), but would begin eroding state sovereignty by limiting the amount of
income on municipal bonds that may be exempted from taxes.
CONCLUSION
The years following the subprime mortgage crisis placed tremendous
strain on municipal governments’ abilities to raise capital in the municipal
bond market.212 Through the BAB program, the federal government
provided municipal issuers with the option of a subsidized taxable bond to
supplement existing tax-exempt municipal bonds. This gave issuers a
powerful new method of raising capital213 while saving the federal
government substantial tax revenue by delivering a more efficient federal
subsidy to municipal issuers.214 While a number of politicians would create
a subsidized taxable municipal bond system similar to that in the BAB
program, not all proposals are created equally. Wholesale replacement of
the tax-exempt market with taxable bonds may have the virtue of
eliminating a tax-exempt system widely criticized as being inefficient and
inequitable, but runs the risk of displacing investors from the municipal
bond market.215 Furthermore, such proposals create the possibility of
increasing market volatility and eroding principles of state sovereign
immunity under the U.S. Constitution.216 To date, only President Obama’s
proposals embrace the virtues of the BAB program—greater efficiency,
equity, and market access—but avoid the problems associated with a
wholesale elimination of the tax-exempt municipal bond.
The tax exemption given to interest earned on municipal bonds is one
of the last remaining bulwarks guarding against the gradual erosion of
states’ sovereign power to raise capital. Thus, despite its flaws, the taxexemption system should be retained, albeit in a limited form, and
supplemented with a subsidized taxable bond. As the American Jobs Act
suggests, the inefficiencies and inequities that persist in the traditional taxexempt municipal bond system might be offset by limiting the windfall to
investors in the upper tax brackets by capping the amount of income
exempt from federal taxes. Overall, in creating a more workable tax
expenditure system for municipal bonds, I believe that supplementing the
traditional tax-exempt municipal bond market with subsidized taxable
bonds, much like President Obama’s proposals, best walks the line between

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Parts II.B.1 and IV.A.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Parts IV.C and IV.D.
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upholding principles of state sovereignty and creating a more efficient,
equitable, and stable municipal bond market.
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